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Abstract
This paper postulates that the effect of unemployment benefits on the hazard rates changes considerably using a tra-
ditional duration model that uses only unemployment insurance (UI) data, or deals with unemployment assistance
(UA) as a mere extension of UI, instead of an extra time duration model that accounts separately for transition rates
to work of the unemployed who receive UI and UA. For UI recipients the hazard rate rises dramatically when UI
benefits lapse approaches. On the contrary, for UA recipients the hazard rate remains flat or even has a slight fall
nearby the UA lapse. Finally, there is a group of unemployed qualified for UA that quit UI due to the income fall that
they will experience when they pass from UI to UA.
Key words: unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, mixed proportional hazard model, sequential exits,
unobserved heterogeneity.
JEL classification: J64.
1. Introduction
The design of an efficient Unemployment Compensation System (UCS) is a common
concern of policy makers in OECD and transition countries. As is well known, in most of
those countries the UCS is organised in two programs: unemployment insurance (UI) and,
mainly after UI lapse, unemployment assistance (UA). The objective of this paper is to as-
sess what can be learned about the influence of the UCS on the unemployment duration with
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administrative data records coming from an Unemployment Agency. We show that the infor-
mation about UA matters in whatever analysis of the effect of unemployment benefits on the
hazard rates. We find theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the bias in which the
traditional approach incurs. Thus, we will observe that the hazard rate of finding a job
changes considerably when we specify a traditional duration model that takes account of
only UI information (TDM), or deals with UA as a mere extension of UI (complete benefits
model, CBM), instead of an extra time duration model that accounts separately for transition
rates from unemployment benefits (ETDM) to work of the unemployed who receive UI and
those who receive UA after UI has expired. In addition this paper examines why some unem-
ployed in Spain 1, a country that is frequently criticised for having a generous UCS, qualified
for getting UA decided to quit the UCS while they were receiving UI. We think that the dis-
tinction between UI and UA in a richer and suited specification should offer enough argu-
ments for policy makers to better understand the determinants of welfare duration, and their
associated costs, meaning an important step toward developing future public policies to pre-
serve a possible crisis of the Welfare System.
The analysis of the influence of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration and
job search behaviour is also a general purpose of empirical studies. The standard prediction 2
is that unemployment benefits —the level and the entitlement duration— tend to increase the
duration of unemployment. This argument has been one of the most influential explanations
of why unemployment rates are higher in Western Europe than in USA, where the UCS is
less generous, Layard and Nickell (1986). Despite the important political influence of this
view, the empirical evidence on the effect of the level and the entitlement duration of bene-
fits vary according to the countries, see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for a survey.
In the literature, a number of microeconomic studies do not find effects of the UI level
on the unemployment duration, for example Lynch (1989) for USA, Hujer and Schneider
(1989) for Germany and Groot (1990) for Netherlands. Other studies show that this effect is
negative, for example, Katz and Meyer (1990) and Moffit (1985) for USA, Narendranathan
et al. (1985) for UK and Van den Berg (1990) for Netherlands. On the contrary, the UI level
increase the intensity of job search by the unemployed such as Blau and Robins (1990) for
USA and Wadsworth (1990) for UK. Finally, other studies take account of the possibility
that the impact of UI level on the hazard rate depends on spell duration. Thus, Nickell (1979)
for UK and Fallick (1991) for USA find that UI level effect disappears after 20 weeks.
Regarding the UI entitlement duration effect, Moffit and Nicholson (1982) for USA and
Hunt (1995) for Germany detect that an increase in potential UI duration increases the mean
length unemployment duration. However, generally hazard rates increase when UI exhaus-
tion approaches, for example, Katz and Meyer (1990) for USA, Ham and Rea (1987) for
Canada and Carling et al. (1996) for Sweden. Nevertheless, other studies find that the ten-
dency to leave unemployment increases at the end of unemployment benefit is inaccurate.
For example, Fallick (1991) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for UK find that the ef-
fect of unemployment benefits decreases over time or Micklewright and Nagy (1998) for
Hungary detect no rise in the hazard near the time of benefit exhaustion.
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The studies that analyse the effect of unemployment assistance (UA) on the hazard rate are
scarce. While Micklewright and Nagy (1999) find that UA level discourages the search effort
of the unemployed for Hungary; Earle and Pauna (1998) detect that the effect is null for Roma-
nia. Finally, Erbenova et al. (1998) for Czech Republic and Earle and Pauna (1998) for Roma-
nia observe a work disincentive effect of UA entitlement duration on the hazard rates.
The main idea of the paper can be summarised in figure 1, that represents the unemploy-
ment durations of the unemployed in our administrative database. Let us consider an inflow,
or a cohort, of newly unemployed that enters into the UCS (see appendix A for a further dis-
cussion about UCS in Spain) at the same time, the black zone in the left side of the figure. As
time goes by a part of the cohort, we observe that there are unemployed «n1» (unbroken line
with arrow) who receive UI and quit the UCS to work or exhaust UI «m1» (broken line with
arrow) in a ruled period disappearing from our database. The only thing we know about indi-
viduals such as «m1» is that they remain unemployed at least E1, where E1 is UI entitlement
duration. As they are not eligible for an additional UA entitlement duration, they disappear
from our administrative records (censored observation at E1). But there is also a group of UI
unemployed eligible for an additional UA period after UI lapse. They are represented in the
figure by rhombus arrows (with unbroken and broken lines). The unbroken line with a rhom-
bus arrow portrays those unemployed (n2) who exit out of unemployment under UA to a job;
and finally, the broken line with a rhombus arrow those (m2) who reach the maximum length
of UA. This last observation is censored at E2, being E2 UA entitlement duration.
Faced with that kind of data we have the opportunity of making a traditional ap-
proach to measuring exit rates of finding a job utilising only information of UI (TDM) or
dealing with UA as a mere extension of UI (CBM) without separating their effects. How-
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Figure 1. Unemployment duration of the unemployed using administrative database
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ever, we think that both approaches do not account for biases stemming from differences
between sequential exits hazard rates, one for the unemployed who receive UI and an-
other for UA recipients after UI has expired. On the one hand, we do not suggest estimat-
ing the unemployment benefits effect jointly because hazard rates arise sequentially dur-
ing two periods (ruled and extra) that correspond to different unemployment benefits
schemes whose characteristics and objectives differ: characteristics are different because
while UI is received by the unemployed who worked a minimum contribution period and
its level is a percentage of the worker’s previous earnings; UA is received by the unem-
ployed who exhausted UI whose entitlement duration depends on age (less or more than
45 years old) or mainly on having or not family burdens, and moreover the UA level is
based on the National Minimum Wage. Objectives stands out because while UI allows
job seekers to receive offers with more attractive wages, and thus, in theory, to secure
more productive jobs; UA is granted to the unemployed with low incomes to reconcile
the objective of social equity in society. On the other hand, if we measure the hazard
rates of finding a job with only UI data, we will undervalue the current unemployment
duration because we do not take account of UA duration in those unemployed who ex-
hausted UI. A simple analysis with our data helps to appreciate this evidence. We see
looking at table B1 in the appendix B that the current unemployment duration of the un-
employed who receive UI was 8.69 months in 1991 that is prolonged to approximately
15.59 months adding UA data of the unemployed who exhausted UI. Therefore, the cur-
rent unemployment duration is undervalued 6.9 months in our analysis because there is a
percentage (78.5-42.2=36.3%) of the unemployed that remained in unemployment re-
ceiving UA after UI has expired. This evidence is also apparent in the rest of the years.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. A theoretical framework about the ef-
fect of UI and UA on the behaviour of the unemployed is developed in section 2. The em-
pirical model and likelihood function are presented in section 3. The data in section 4.
Variables and empirical results appear in section 5. Finally, we summarise our findings
in the last section.
2. Theoretical framework
In this section we model the impact of UI and UA on unemployment duration. To model
the effect of the duration of benefits —as well as the more usual effect of the level of bene-
fits— we formulate the problem within the standard labour-leisure framework developed by
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) rather than within the usual job search framework. We first es-
timate the effect of UI on unemployment duration and, later the impact of UA after the ex-
haustion of UI. Because we wish to examine the effect of potential UI and UA durations and
because we intend to apply our model to a set of unemployed who have experience lengthy
periods of unemployment, we suppose that unemployed make fairly long-run decisions re-
garding the uses of their time.
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In that context following to Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) we assume that a newly un-
employed considers his or her budget constraint over a long planning horizon and chooses
the number of days he or she wants to work or to be unemployed. The unemployed is as-
sumed to maximise utility, which is a function of total net income over the period and num-
ber of days of unemployment. Unemployment provides utility for two reasons: leisure time
and opportunity for productive job search. For most purposes we will not differentiate be-
tween these two uses of non-employed time. Hence our model of unemployment is more
closely related to labor-leisure choice models of labor supply than it is to search-theoretic
models.
Figure 2 shows the budget constraints. Lines AZ and ACD show the trade-off between
months of unemployment (U) and total net income (Y) in the absence and presence of UI.
Utility is maximized subject to these tradeoffs. In the absence of UI, an additional day of un-
employment decreases income by net wage (W), the result is portrayed by line AZ. However,
in presence of UI, each additional day of unemployment, starting at point A, reduces income
by W-BUI, where BUI is the daily UI level. This expression can be written as W(1–RUI), where
RUI=BUI/W is the UI replacement ratio. The budget constraint has a convex kink in point C,
the month of unemployment benefit exhaustion, because the unemployed ceases to be subsi-
dised. After the exhaustion of UI (E1) an additional day of unemployment reduces the indi-
vidual’s income by the potential net wage W, line CD. Prior to the exhaustion of UI, an addi-
tional day of unemployment reduces income by less than W, because UI is received and
W(1–RUI) < W.
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Figure 2. Budget constraint for the unemployed who receive UI and UA
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Utility maximization subject to the kinked budget line ACD will differ according to the
shape of the individual preference map. For a nonexhaustee of UI, a tangency will occur
along segment AC, facing a marginal daily wage of W(1–RUI) and leave the UI before bene-
fits are exhausted. For those exhaustees of UI, a tangency will occur along segment CD, re-
maining unemployed for some time beyond the maximum duration.
On that situation, how does the budget constraint of Figure 2 change when some unem-
ployed access UA after UI has expired around point C? We may make some comments infor-
mally following Moffit and Nicholson’s model. Firstly, there is a new budget constraint,
ACC’D’ that captures the behaviour of the unemployed who receive UI (budget AC), UA
(budget CC’) or non receivers of unemployment benefits (budget C’D’). Secondly, the slope
of UA recipients, W(1–RUA), is higher than the slope of UI recipients, W(1–RUI), because
RUA < RUI. Finally, the new budget presents two kink points (C,C’).
The behaviour of the unemployed under all these new additional features is the follow-
ing: (1) A nonexhaustee of UI, without eligible conditions to access UA, is unaffected by the
change of adding UA data, remaining along AC. It is uncertain when he or she will find a job
and what the wage will be but he or she face income and leisure in the same direction as
when we only consider UI data. (2) A nonexhaustee of UI, eligible for UA, prefers more in-
come than leisure due to the pay fall that he or she will experience when passing from UI to
UA, reducing his or her unemployment duration. (3) An exhaustee of UI at the initial kink C
will either stay at the kink and move to C’ (if he or she is eligible for UA), or locate along
CC’ or C’D’, increasing unemployment in either case. Finally (4) an exhaustee of UI and UA
will experience various combinations of income and substitution effects increasing unem-
ployment in either case.
3. The empirical model.
The empirical model used to study the transition rates from unemployment benefits to
work of the unemployed receiving UI and those receiving UA is a continuous mixed propor-
tional hazard (mph). The hazard representation for the mph 3 is the following:
[1]
where subscript i and j show the individual and the period of unemployment under benefits
(j=1=UI, j=2=UA), respectively. The term tij is the current duration of i’s j’th unemployment
benefit period. This equation asserts that the hazard rate out of unemployment under benefits
into employment is influenced by three factors: The function 00ij(t), named the baseline ha-
zard function, captures the effect of the time elapsed in the unemployment state on the ins-
tantaneous conditional probability of finding a job when all the factors hold constant. The
function +ij(X) presents the influence of time invariant and time varying variables on the ha-
zard rate of finding a job. Finally, the function @ij(A) accounts for the effects of unobserved
heterogeneity components such as ability, attitudes, skills, etc. on the hazard rate of finding a
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job. This function is usually assumed to be equal to cijA, where cij represents specific transi-
tion intensities between different states. In our case we analyse only transitions between
unemployment benefits and employment and therefore we make cij=1 by normalisation. We
also assume A to be fixed across periods for a given individual and to have a distribution G(.)
across individuals. All the three functions must assure that expression [1] is non-negative.
We guarantee this property using an exponential representation for each function.
3.1. The likelihood function and the estimation method
The specification of a traditional likelihood function for a sample of unemployed that
enters at the same time into the Spanish UCS contains complete and censored unemployment
observations making use of UI or UI+UA data. Complete observations refer to the unem-
ployed who quit the UCS to work. Censored observations correspond to the unemployed
who exhaust UI making use of UI data, or exhaust UI or UA managing UI+UA data. The
specification of the traditional likelihood function is given by:
[2]
where B = ij; the contribution to the likelihood function of the complete and censored obser-
vations are the density function f(ti1) and survival function S(ti1), respectively; di1 is a
dummy variable that takes value 1 when the unemployed quits the UCS to work, otherwise
zero.
We think that this likelihood function would be incomplete and estimations obtained by
maximising [2] may be biased due to two reasons. Firstly, there are censored observations
making use of only UI data that are complete because there are some unemployed that access
UA after UI has expired. Secondly, if we treat UA duration as a mere extension of UI dura-
tion (using UI+UA data) data, we will not account for differences between sequential exits,
one for the unemployed who receive UI and another for UA recipients. Accordingly, we de-
velop the following extra time likelihood function to cover this bias:
[3]
This likelihood function contains four components: the first component captures the
likelihood (density function f(ti1)) that the unemployed quits the UCS to work receiving UI
(n1, see also figure 1 to understand our terminology) in time ti1; the second component mea-
sures the likelihood (survival function S(ti1)) that the unemployed exhausts UI (m1) disap-
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pearing from the records forever; the third and fourth component account for the likelihood
that the unemployed who has access to UA (after UI has expired) may find a job (n2) or ex-
haust UA (m2). Those last two components cover the bias of equation [2] and are composed
of the product of the density function f(ti2) and S(ti2) by the survival function S(ti1).
In [3] di1 di2, di3 are dummy variables; di1 takes value 1 when the unemployed exits to a
job receiving UI (0 for the rest); di2 is equal to 1 when the unemployed exhausts UI disap-
pearing from the records for ever (0 for the rest), and finally, di3 separates the uncensored
and censored durations of recipients who get UA after the UI exhaustion. It takes value 1
when the unemployed exit to a job (0 for the rest).
The parameter estimates are obtained by maximising the next likelihood function across
all N unemployed:
[4]
where G(A) is the distribution function for A, E is the range of A and L(B|X,A) is given by [3].
To complete the specification of this likelihood function, we specify the distribution function
G(A) for the unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, following Heckman and Singer (1984c), we
use a non-parametric method that approximates the unknown probability distribution for a fi-
nite number of support points, and uses the data to estimate the location and the probability
mass associated with each support point. The basic procedure is to estimate a model with a
finite number of support points, starting with one (which is just a model without heteroge-
neity), and adding support points until the estimated model becomes singular. In particular,
we restrict all the points to being on the unit interval, and we constrain one point of support
to be 0 and one to be 1 and estimate the location and probability mass associated with each
support point noting that the cumulative mass over all support points must add up to 1. The
rest of the points will be estimated on the interval (0,1).
We used the CTM computer programme to estimate the parameters of the model (see Yi,
Honoré and Walker, 1987). This programme estimates jointly the values of the parameter
vector B and the support points that characterise the underlying distribution of the unob-
served heterogeneity component A by an iterative maximum likelihood method. The maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of B conditional on the number of support points have all the prop-
erties of an extremum estimator (consistency and asymptotic normality). This estimation
procedure has been used before, among others, by Heckman, Hotz and Walker (1985) with
demographic data, and Vilcassim and Jain (1991) with marketing data.
4. The data
The data used in this analysis come from the HSIPRE (Histórico del Sistema de
Prestaciones por Desempleo) administrative database. It contains information of the unem-
ployed that receive UI and UA from the Spanish Employment Agency (INEM, Instituto
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Nacional de Empleo). A thorough description of this database can be found in Cebrián et al.
(1996). The advantage of the HSIPRE database is that it provides accurate information of the
level of benefits, the current and the entitlement unemployment benefit periods (in days) and
information of several unemployment benefit periods for the same individual. The disadvan-
tage is the lack of information about the labour force status the days after UI and UA are ex-
hausted by the unemployed and, unfortunately, it does not include information about marital
status, labour market situation of the spouse, industry, size of the firm in the previous job and
workers who quit (and therefore are not entitled to access UCS) or have never been involun-
tarily separated from their jobs.
Our sample is drawn from the inflow to the register of unemployment of the unemployed
with ages between 18 and 59 years old 4 that entered the Spanish UCS during February 1987.
We focus our analysis on the unemployed entitled to UI and UA, where UA is received by
the unemployed who exhausted UI. We follow those unemployed until they escape from un-
employment or exhaust the unemployment benefit periods. The resulting sample contains
11,668 unemployed who received UI of whom 3,077 unemployed received UA.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics on a variety of characteristics for the unemployed of
this sample. The first column of table 1 presents characteristics of the unemployed who re-
ceive UI or both types of unemployment benefits using UI+UA data. The second column
separates characteristics of the unemployed who receive UI or UA. We compare the results
of both columns, and we show the advantages of using UA in a proper way by presenting the
data as in the second column. The conclusions about the characteristics of those unemployed
may present outstanding alterations making use of unemployment benefit data separately or
jointly. For example, we may say that the unemployed remain in longer current unemploy-
ment periods on UA (461.15 days) than on UI (217.69 days), and receive lower UA level
(219.37€) than UI level (363.25€); however, those evidences are not perceived using data
jointly because the current unemployment duration (339.95 days) and the level of benefits
(328.63€) are a mixture of both types of unemployment benefits. Furthermore, the percent-
ages of the unemployed who exit from the UCS will be very different using the data in a
wrong way. Thus, 58.8 percent of the unemployed exhaust unemployment benefit periods
and 41.2 percent get a job making use of unemployment benefit data jointly; however, if we
use unemployment benefit data separately: 31.4 percent of the unemployed get a job receiv-
ing UI and only 42.2 percent exhaust UI because 26.4 percent access UA. Concerning this
last group of the unemployed who remain longer on the UCS thanks to the UA, 37.1 percent
(9.8 percent of the entire sample) get a job receiving UA and 62.9 percent (16.6 percent of
the entire sample) exhaust UA. Making a proper reading of table 1, we may say that the un-
employed who receive UI 5 are on average younger, a higher fraction of males, have higher
net wages in the last job as well as a higher level of benefits, have less family burdens and re-
main shorter periods in unemployment than those unemployed who receive UA.
Now, we show in figure 3 the habitual empirical hazard with the Kaplan-Meier estima-
tion. In this figure, the empirical hazards of the unemployed on the TDM are overvalued
compared to the ETDM for UI data (UI seq). This empirical evidence justifies a theoretical
An extra time duration model with application to unemployment duration under benefits in Spain 141
142 JOSÉ M.ª ARRANZ, JUAN MURO
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on variables of the unemployed who receive benefits
Variables
UI+UA data
Benefits separately
UI UA
Mean Std
Sample
(%)
Mean Std
Sample
(%)
Mean Std
Sample
(%)
Gender
Male 65.8 65.8 53.7
Female 34.2 34.2 46.3
Age (years)
Entry age 31.80 10.23 100 31.80 10.23 100 33.64 9.91 100
Exit age 32.75 10.41 100 32.4 10.36 100 34.92 9.90 100
Exit age square 1180.8 793.95 100 1157.6 785.28 100 1317.9 772.9 100
Family burdens
With 40.4 27.3 86.9
Without 59.6 72.7 13.1
Unemployment duration (days)
Current 339.95 360.17 100 217.69 215.44 100 461.15 205.82 100
Entitlement 447.83 369.08 100 294.72 242.46 100 577.52 96.25 100
Duration until the exhaustion 107.88 183.58 100 77.03 165.06 100 116.36 179.83 100
(Duration until the exhaustion /10)2 453.37 1001.6 100 331.77 922.54 100 458.70 850.55 100
Net wage (€/ month) 401.18 131.80 100 401.12 131.80 100 379.66 98.99 100
Level of benefits(€/ month) 328.63 101.93 100 363.25 86.31 100 219.37 32.51 100
Cause of unemployment
End of contract 95.9 95.9 95.7
Others 4.1 4.1 4.3
Exit from the UCS
Get a Job 41.2 31.4 37.1 (9.8)*
Exhaust benefits 58.8 42.2 62.9 (16.6)*
Job category
1 7.7 7.7 3.2
2 8.9 8.9 8.4
3 4.5 4.5 3.6
4 12.0 12.0 12.1
5 21.7 21.7 20.2
6 18.2 18.2 18.5
7 27.1 27.1 34.2
Sample 11,668 11,668 3,077
Legend. Job category variable: 1. High levels and associate professional technicians, foremen and supervisors; 2.
Technical assistants and skilled clerical workers; 3. Semi-skilled clerical workers; 4. Unskilled clerical workers; 5.
Skilled production workers; 6. Semi-skilled production workers; 7. Unskilled production workers.
* We present in brackets the percentage of the unemployed who access UA: 9.8 percent (of 11,668 unemployed)
get a job receiving UA and 16.6 percent exhaust UA.
bias outlined through the mentioned likelihood specifications: the traditional hazard rates are
overvalued and therefore the expected unemployment duration is undervalued. We also ob-
serve in figure 3 a phase with increasing exit rates during the first months of unemployment
approximately until the second month (a positive duration dependence), followed by a phase
of declining rates until the ninth month (a negative duration dependence) and constant from
the tenth month onwards.
5. Empirical results
The discussion in this section is separated into two parts. Firstly, we examine the ex-
pected influence of variables of the unemployed on the hazard rates of finding a job. Sec-
ondly, we deal with the estimation effects of variables on the hazard rates using the three
models previously described.
5.1. The expected influence of variables on the hazard rates
Before going on to the estimations results, a look at the expected influence of variables
on the hazard rates of finding a job is instructive. Specifically, we are interested in trying to
assess if the unemployed face different probabilities and if there are variables that may ex-
plain this. In the context of the search theory, the hazard rates of finding a job depend on the
probability of receiving a job offer and the probability of accepting such offer.
The probability of receiving a job offer depends on variables such as gender, age, educa-
tional levels, the state of the labour market demand and the parameters of the UCS (i.e. the level
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Figure 3. Empirical hazard rate of the unemployed making use of a traditional UI duration
model (UI) and an extra time duration model for UI recipients (UI seq)
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and entitlement duration of benefits). The age variable is related to the hazard rate of finding a
job with an inverted U form if the youngest and the oldest group have lower productivity with re-
spect to the wages paid. Eight dummy age variables are introduced in our models by intervals of
five years to capture this inverted U form on the hazard rates. Seven job category dummy vari-
ables are introduced in the models as a proxy of educational levels. We expect that the unem-
ployed with better qualifications have higher hazard rates of finding a job than unskilled workers
because they may receive more and better job offers. We think that ceteris paribus the expected
theoretical effect of the gender variable on the hazard rates of finding a job, in absence of gender
discrimination, is ambiguous. Even so higher female unemployment rate and lower female la-
bour supply are arguments in favour of the unchallenged empirical evidence on the fact that
males present higher hazard rates of finding a job than females.
The state of the labour market demand is measured in our models with two variables: the
quarterly regional unemployment rate and the cause of unemployment (end of contract or
others —layoffs, etc.—). The quarterly regional unemployment rate indicates the local la-
bour market conditions of the unemployed. We expect that those who live in regions with
lower regional unemployment rates have a higher hazard rate of finding a job because there
are more vacancies in the firms. To have been registered at the UCS because of the end of the
contract has a positive effect on the hazard rate of the unemployed because they may start to
search for a new job before the end of the contract due to they know the date of the extinction
of their job.
The income that an unemployed earns in unemployment and the entitlement duration are
variables that have an influence on the search effort and therefore, the hazard rates of finding
a job. The hazard rates would be lower among workers who have longer entitlement duration
because they have more time to search, to assess and to accept job offers. However, some
empirical studies, among them Meyer (1990), consider that the hazard rates are constant or
decreasing in the earlier unemployment months and rise dramatically just prior to when un-
employment benefits lapse because the value of being unemployed and the reservation wage
decrease. A disincentive effect is produced at the beginning of the unemployment benefit pe-
riod and an incentive effect at the end. This tendency to leave unemployment in the days be-
fore the entitlement period expires is captured in our models by a variable that is a subtrac-
tion between entitlement and current unemployment benefit duration. Furthermore, we have
included a quadratic form to get a non linear effect on the hazard rates of finding a job.
In relation to the income of the unemployed, we may obtain the replacement rate divid-
ing the level of benefits during the unemployment period by the income received during the
last employment period. However, we analyse separately the effect of the level of benefits
and the net wage of the last job because we have found a short variability of the replacement
rate variable. The level of benefits predicts a double effect on the intensity of a job search by
the unemployed. Firstly, an incentive effect occurs because the level of benefits increases the
intensity of a job search by the unemployed and the probability of finding a job on the unem-
ployed (see Tannery, 1983). Secondly, a disincentive effect is produced because a high bene-
fits level causes the unemployed to be less willing to accept jobs. Four variables, interactions
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between UI level and to be unemployed with a specific unemployment duration (0-6, 7-12,
13-18 and more than 18 months) are included in our estimations. With those variables, we try
to measure the impact of UI level on the escape from unemployment across unemployment
benefit periods. The level of UA is not included as an interaction with the unemployment du-
ration variable because there is a short variability across periods.
The probability that an unemployed accepts a job offer depends on variables that affect
his reservation wage. Among those variables, we have information on the net wages in the
last job and family burdens variable. On the one hand, the net wage of the last job reflects the
incentive or disincentive effect on search and acceptance of job offers by the unemployed
(see Lancaster, 1979). So, the unemployed with higher (lower) net wages in the last job have
a negative (positive) effect on the hazard rate of finding a job because they have a higher res-
ervation wage. On the other hand, to have family burdens may have an incentive or disincen-
tive effect on the hazard rates of finding a job. A disincentive effect is produced when the un-
employed with family burdens reduce the hazard rates because they know that they may
obtain a new unemployment benefit (UA) in the future and therefore they do not accept unin-
teresting jobs. In the opposite sense, if we attend to a simple household allocation model
where the leisure of wives and husbands may be substitutable through home production, the
presence of family burdens means that wife’s market work will require the purchase of child
care, lowering his/her net wage, increasing the search effort and the acceptability of a given
offer by the unemployed to escape from unemployment, see Cullen and Gruber (2000) 6.
Finally, we have included in our models a variable ((UIe – UAe benefits) that represents
the gap between the expected UI and UA level to capture why there are unemployed quali-
fied to get UA that decided to quit the UCS while they were receiving UI. We expect the
higher the gap between the expected UI and UA level the higher the hazard rates of leaving
the UCS of this type of unemployed because they increase the intensity of a job search due to
the big loss that they experience when they pass from UI to UA.
5.2. Results
The estimation results of a TDM, CBM and ETDM are analysed in this sub-section. The
first two models are estimated through the traditional approach (likelihood function [2]) that
measures the hazard rates of finding a job using only UI data (TDM) or UA data as extension
of UI data (CBM). The third model, estimated through the likelihood function [3], accounts
separately for transition rates from UI and UA to work (ETDM). Table 2 presents the estima-
tions results of those models with unobserved heterogeneity effects. Just to offer a simple
and intuitive way of interpreting our results in these estimations we assume an exponential
distribution for the baseline function. Although it implies no duration dependence this re-
stricted model lets us illustrate with a simple distribution (only one parameter for the base-
line) that the parameters of the covariates in the TDM are always higher (overvalued in mag-
nitude) than in the ETDM (for UI recipients) 8. The unobserved heterogeneity terms are
controlled by the non parametric procedure described in section 3.1. The method of estima-
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Table 2
Parameters estimates with unobserved heterogeneity and standard errors. TDM, CBM and
ETDM
TDM CBM ETDM
UI UI+UA UI UA
Variables Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign.
Intercepta –4.331 0.611 *** –5.994 0.486 *** –5.328 0.557 *** — — —
Gender (female) –0.792 0.046 *** –0.754 0.041 *** –0.528 0.043 *** –1.064 0.079 ***
Age
>=18 & <=25 0.288 0.074 *** 0.066 0.067 0.173 0.070 ** 0.465 0.131 ***
>25 & <=30 0.258 0.068 *** 0.136 0.062 ** 0.168 0.065 ** 0.327 0.120 ***
>30 & <=35 0.080 0.076 –0.001 0.066 0.024 0.071 0.112 0.127
>35 & <=40 (&) — — — — — — — — — — — —
>40 & <=45 –0.061 0.086 –0.023 0.075 –0.062 0.079 –0.060 0.144
>45 & <=50 –0.292 0.096 *** –0.074 0.084 –0.092 0.091 0.064 0.167
>50 & <=55 –0.264 0.094 *** –0.100 0.085 –0.114 0.090 –0.230 0.183
>55 –1.023 0.104 *** –0.692 0.096 *** –0.623 0.099 *** –0.580 0.211 ***
Job category
1 0.397 0.075 *** 0.275 0.067 *** 0.272 0.071 *** –0.122 0.168
2 –0.183 0.071 *** –0.138 0.063 ** –0.138 0.067 ** –0.193 0.144
3 0.009 0.097 0.043 0.086 0.029 0.092 0.241 0.166
4 –0.175 0.072 ** –0.106 0.064 –0.124 0.068 0.031 0.128
5(&) — — — — — — — — — — — —
6 –0.173 0.059 *** –0.147 0.052 *** –0.112 0.054 ** –0.246 0.117 **
7 –0.201 0.054 *** –0.250 0.047 *** –0.152 0.050 *** –0.307 0.093 ***
Family burdens (with) –0.661 0.073 *** –0.225 0.051 *** –0.131 0.062 ** 0.025 0.096
End of the contract 0.098 0.085 –0.144 0.072 ** 0.140 0.079 0.244 0.180
Reg. unemployment rateb,c –0.009 0.003 *** –0.009 0.003 *** –0.006 0.003 ** –0.011 0.006
Duration until exhaustion
(days/100)b 0.161 0.031 *** 0.299 0.028 *** –0.324 0.029 *** 0.288 0.077 ***
(Duration until exhaustion)2
(days/10000)a –0.028 0.005 *** –0.068 0.004 *** 0.039 0.005 *** –0.044 0.012 ***
Log net wage (€/month)c –0.455 0.139 *** 0.046 0.078 –0.256 0.129 ** 1.257 0.135 ***
Log benefits (€/month)b — — — — — — — — — –2.788 0.154 ***
Duration & log level of benefitsb
From 0 to 6 months 0.144 0.010 *** 0.143 0.008 *** 0.069 0.009 *** — — —
From 7 to 12 months 0.031 0.015 ** 0.046 0.011 *** 0.020 0.014 — — —
From 13 to 18 months 0.032 0.020 0.036 0.012 *** –0.028 0.017 — — —
More than 18 months –0.152 0.194 –0.271 0.089 *** 0.034 0.181 — — —
Log ((UIe – UAe) level)) (€/month)b 0.271 0.016 *** 0.065 0.011 *** 0.136 0.014 *** — — —
Sample (% censored) 11,688(68.7) 11,688(58.9) 11,688(42.2) 3,077(63.2)
Negative log – likelihood 26,470.102 35,071.733 58,059.396
Legend. Job category in Table 1; & Indicates the characteristics of the reference individual; *** significant at 1 per-
cent level, ** significant at 5 percent level.
a: We have not included an intercept in the ETDM for UA data because there is collinearity with the UA level that is
0.75 percent of the SMW.
b: time varying covariate. All variables derived from HISPRE database, except c: quarterly regional unemployment
rate (source: Spanish Labour Force Survey, EPA), and tax liabilities on earnings to give net wages rather than gross
earnings (authors’ estimates).
tion is the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE) developed by Heckman
and Singer (1984c) 7.
The estimation 9 coefficients of table 2 confirm our expectations. The impact of vari-
ables on the hazard rate changes in magnitude and significance across the three models. We
first compare estimation results among models. Later, we describe transitions from UI and
UA to a job using the ETDM.
Considering results of the TDM and ETDM for UI recipients, we see that most variables
present overvalued hazard rates on the TDM. Other variables disclose strong sensitivity. We
comment on the results of a few variables. For example, being a woman in the UCS decreases
the logarithm of the hazard rate by 0.792 in the TDM and by less in the ETDM, around 0.528.
Likewise, the age interval between 18 and 25 years increases the logarithm of the hazard rate by
0.288 (relative to an unemployed aged between 35 and 40 years) in the TDM and by a lower
magnitude (0.173) in the ETDM. Another way to observe the overvalued effect of parameters in
the TDM appears when we calculate elasticities in table 3. The probability of exiting from unem-
ployment of females is 54.71 percent lower than males making use of the TDM; however, this
magnitude continues to be overvalued, around 13.69 percent the lesser effect of hazard rates of
females compared to the ETDM. In the same way, the remaining variables present overvalued
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Table 3
The elasticity of the variables corresponding to estimations of table 2
TDM CBM ETDM
UI UI+UA UI UA
Elast. Sign. Elast. Sign. Elast. Sign. Elast. Sign.
Gender (female) –54.71 *** –52.93 *** –41.02 *** –65.48 ***
Age (years)
>=18 & <=25 33.42 *** 6.86 18.92 ** 59.15 ***
>25 & <=30 29.48 *** 14.61 ** 18.26 ** 38.73 ***
>30 & <=35 8.35 –0.14 2.39 11.82
>35 & <=40 (&) — — — — — — — — — — — —
>40 & <=45 –5.89 –2.25 –6.03 –5.85
>45 & <=50 –25.34 *** –7.12 –8.75 6.63
>50 & <=55 –23.17 *** –9.49 –10.79 –20.51
>55 –64.03 *** –49.94 *** –46.36 *** –43.99 ***
Job category
1 48.74 *** 31.7 *** 31.26 *** –11.48
2 –16.70 *** –12.9 ** –12.88 ** –17.58
3 0.91 4.35 2.96 27.31
4 –16.04 ** –10.07 * –11.69 * 3.18
5(&) — — — — — — — — — — — —
6 –15.91 *** –13.69 *** –10.63 ** –21.83 **
7 –18.20 *** –22.09 *** –14.13 *** –26.47 ***
Family burdens (with) –48.38 *** –20.13 *** –12.28 ** 2.51
End of the contract 10.30 –13.41 ** 15.08 * 27.68
Legend. Job category in Table 1; & Indicates the characteristics of the reference individual; *** significant at 1 per-
cent level, ** significant at 5 percent level and * significant at 10 percent level.
effects of elasticities in the TDM. For example, the unemployed aged between 18 and 25 years
have higher hazard rates of finding a job than the reference individual overvalue of 14.5 percent
in the TDM, 11.22 percent the unemployed aged between 25 and 30 years old, etc. Therefore, if
TDM overvalues the hazard rates of finding a job, it will undervalue the expected unemployment
duration.
There are two variables that present strong sensitivity in the estimations: the days before
the exhaustion of the benefits and its square form. Those variables and the hazard rates pres-
ent an inverted-U and U form relation using the TDM and the ETDM for UI recipients, re-
spectively. The TDM says that the unemployed increase the hazard rates up to 287.5 days be-
fore the exhaustion of UI and thereafter decrease them. However, the ETDM argues that the
unemployed decrease the hazard rates at the beginning and increase (from 415.4 days before
the end) when UI exhaustion approaches.
Comparing the effects of variables on the hazard rates using the CBM and ETDM, we
see that both models display differences based on the different specification of the likelihood
function. While the ETDM captures sequential exits, one for the unemployed who receive UI
and another for UA recipients after UI has expired, the CBM model measures the hazard
rates of the unemployed who receive unemployment benefits without separating the effects.
This different way of making use of unemployment benefits data causes the hazard rates of
both models to change considerably. For example, making use of the CBM we may say that
the level of benefits motivates the intensity of a job search by the unemployed during eigh-
teen months and demotivates afterwards; where we do not know if this effect is produced by
the UI or UA level. However, separating the effects of each type of unemployment benefits
thanks to the ETDM we observe that while the UI level increases the hazard rates of the un-
employed during six months disappearing afterwards, the UA level demotivates the intensity
of a job search by the unemployed.
There are more variables that present mistaken reading of hazard rates effects comparing
the estimation results of the CBM and ETDM. For example, those unemployed that enter the
UCS because of the end of a contract decrease the hazard rates of finding a job using the
CBM; nevertheless, this effect is not perceived either on recipients of UI or on recipients of
UA using the ETDM. Other variables significantly affect the hazard rates on the ETDM but
not on the CBM. Thus, recipients of UI and UA aged between 18 and 25 years present higher
hazard rates than the reference individual making use of the ETDM; this effect is not seen on
the CBM.
Now, we comment on the transition rates from UI and UA to a job using the ETDM.
Overall, recipients of UI and UA present similar effects on the hazard rates of variables such
as gender, age group and job category but asymmetric effects on the level of benefits, the net
wage of the last job and the days before the exhaustion of the unemployment benefits vari-
able. For example, gender has a strong effect on the hazard rate. In particular, being a
woman 10 reduces the conditional probability of leaving unemployment under benefits in a
41 percent for UI recipients and even more for UA recipients: a 65.48 percent. Age variable
and hazard rates present a negative association when the unemployed receive UI and UA:
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while younger unemployed (between 18 and 30 years) have shorter unemployment periods
than the reference individual; older people (more than 55 years) present less probability of
finding a job. So, we do not detect a demotivating effect of unemployment benefits on the
probability of young persons exiting to employment 11. The pattern of job category coeffi-
cients (proxy of qualifications or educational level) indicates that UI has an incentive effect
on recipients with the highest qualifications; while it has a disincentive effect on UI and UA
recipients with the worst qualifications. For UI recipients, the hazard rates of finding a job of
those with the highest level of qualifications (high levels and associate professional techni-
cians, foremen and supervisors) are 31.26 percent higher than the hazard of the reference job
category group (skilled production workers); whereas the hazard rates of the semi-skilled
and unskilled production workers are lower at around 10.63 percent and 14.16 percent, re-
spectively. For UA recipients, the results show that the best qualified unemployed do not af-
fect the hazard rates; however, the effect of the unemployed with the lowest educational
level presents a negative impact on the hazard rates, around 21.83 percent and 26.47 percent
for semi-skilled and unskilled production workers, respectively.
With respect to the parameters of the UCS, we show a couple of figures. Figure 4 shows
the elasticity of the exit rate out of welfare with respect to the level of benefits in terms of en-
titlement. For UI recipients, the exit rate is inelastic. The elasticity value varies with entitle-
ment. It goes from a weak positive effect for a potential duration of benefits up to twelve
months to a negative effect for entitlement periods between 13 and 18 months and positive
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Figure 4. Elasticity of the exit rate out of welfare with respect to the level of benefits in terms
of entitlement
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for periods longer than 18 months. We must point out those elasticity values over six months
either have a low level of statistical significance (significant only at a 10 per cent level) or
are statistically insignificant. For UA recipients, the hazard rate is elastic. The interaction be-
tween elasticity and entitlement does not exist and the level of benefits has a strong negative
effect on the conditional probability of leaving welfare.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the hazard rate and time until benefits lapse for
UI and UA recipients. As you can see, for UI recipients the hazard rate rises dramatically
when UI benefits lapse approaches. As is well known this behaviour reflects the joint effect
of falling reservation wage and rising job search intensity. On the contrary, for UA recipients
the hazard rate remains flat or even has a slight fall nearby the UA lapse.
Finally, we say a few words on the possible existence of an UA trap. Following solid
empirical evidence on the fact that what really matters is the duration of benefits some au-
thors talk about an UA trap. In other words, some authors say that the unemployed eligible
for an additional UA period are damned to exhaust their UI benefits. Our findings do not
support this intuition. We find the level of benefits plays an important role among the deter-
minants of the conditional probability of leaving welfare for people potentially qualified for
UA. Our estimation results say that the larger the size of the gap between UI and expected
UA level of benefits the higher the job search intensity that in turn brings on a jump in the
exit rate out of welfare. In consequence, a group of unemployed potentially qualified for UA
quits UCS while receiving UI.
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Figure 5. The hazard rate and time until benefits lapse for UI and UA recipients
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6. Conclusions
This paper has used an administrative data set from the Spanish Employment Agency to
show that the information about UA matters in the explanation of the conditional probability
of leaving unemployment under benefits. In fact, traditional approaches to model hazard
rates from unemployment under benefits to a job that uses only UI data, or deals with UA
data as a mere extension of UI, instead of an extra time duration model that accounts sepa-
rately for transition rates from unemployment benefits to work of the unemployed who re-
ceive UI and those receiving UA after UI has expired, do not handle UCS data in a right way
leading thus to biased estimation of the parameters of the exit rate out of unemployment re-
ceiving benefits. Specifically, traditional approaches overestimate UI hazard rates and hence
underestimate the expected unemployment benefit duration.
Among other results of the paper, we observe that there are characteristics of the unem-
ployed such as gender, qualifications and age that present similar effects on the hazard rates.
Thus, unemployed female, worse qualified unemployed and older unemployed present less
probability of finding a job when they receive UI and UA. However, the level of benefits and
the entitlement duration variable affects asymmetrically the hazard rates: while UI levels
motivates the hazard rates during the first six months and are insignificant afterwards; UA
level affects negatively the transition rates from UA to a job. Concerning the tendency to
leave unemployment in the days before the end of unemployment benefits, the unemployed
who receive UI increase the hazard rates when UI exhaustion approaches; while UA recipi-
ents present a low and flat exit rate out of benefits while reaching the UA lapse.
Finally, we have detected that there is a group of unemployed potentially qualified for
UA that decided to quit UCS while receiving UI. This can be explained by means of an in-
centive effect cause of the gap between the current level of UI and the expected level of UA.
The larger the size of this gap, the larger the magnitude of the incentive effect.
In conclusion, welfare recipients with a long history of unemployment have a low and
flat exit rate out of benefits while reaching the UA lapse. This low and flat exit rate out of
benefits is relatively independent of their job search intensity. Then, labour market policy
measures targeted towards this collective of welfare recipients must be designed with an-
other objective different from increasing job search intensity through reservation wage de-
pletion. We think that public policies must be defined twofold as a combination of training
programs for unemployed specific collectives (e.g. older workers, females, unskilled work-
ers) and information programs for employers so as to reduce the negative impact of long his-
tories of unemployment in the hiring process.
Notes
1. There are not many studies in the Spanish literature that give information about the type of unemployment bene-
fit that the unemployed are receiving in the Spanish UCS. In fact, they only focus on the impact of UI such as
Cebrián et al. (1996) or do not contain information about the level and the entitlement duration effect of unem-
ployment benefits, such as Alba-Ramírez (1999) and Bover et al. (2002). Thus, Cebrián et al. (1996) use a tem-
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poral reduced version of the HSIPRE database, a sample that only contains UI beneficiaries, and find that UI do
not exert a clear negative influence on the job search behaviour of the unemployed. Bover et al. (2002) apprecia-
te a negative influence of receiving benefits on the probability of leaving unemployment making use of a sample
from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA) that contains information of all the unemployed but no about para-
meters of the UCS as the level and entitlement duration of UI and UA. Alba-Ramírez (1999) also finds with the
EPA a negative effect of UI receipt on the re-employment probability and on withdrawal from the labour force.
2. This prediction is based on two theories of the labour market: the job search and the efficiency wage theory.
The job search theory predicts that unemployment benefit causes the unemployed are less eager to search for
accepting jobs, increasing the unemployment duration. The efficiency wage theory says that unemployment
benefits reduce the cost of being unemployed and the demand for labour decreases because workers ask for
higher wages.
3. The identification of this model has been studied by Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984 a,b).
4. The reason for the age limit is to exclude older unemployed (aged 59 or older) that may register problems be-
cause they may possibly access to retirement receiving benefits. Moreover, we want to clear up that we are not
considering the regime of early retirement that exists for workers aged more than 52 in the Spanish UCS.
5. The descriptive statistics variables of UI recipients are the same in a sample with only UI data and another that
separates UI and UA data except for the exit of the UCS variable.
6. Therefore, the elasticity of response to income flows during unemployment will be highest when there are fa-
mily burdens present. Alternatively, this prediction is also consistent with richer models of household alloca-
tion. For example, having children in the household may increase the responsiveness of labour supply to fa-
mily income because family consumption is less flexible with respect to variations in income (due to the fixed
consumption needs that are tied to children), so that leisure must be more flexible, see Mincer (1962).
7. Three support points are sufficient to approximate the probability distribution of the unobserved heteroge-
neity components. The estimated support points for the TDM (CBM in brackets) are 0 (0), 0.1 (0.71) and 1(1)
with associated probability masses of 0.3 (0.5), 0.24 (0.2) and 0.46 (0.3), respectively. For the ETDM, the esti-
mate support points are 0, 0.43 and 1 having probability masses of 0.5, 0.2 and 0.3.
8. In previous versions of this paper, we estimated our three models with more complex and flexible continuous
distributions for the baseline hazard function. With these alternative specifications is difficult to appreciate the
upward bias of TDM parameters in relation to ETDM parameters cause of the mixed nature of the model spe-
cification.
9. The reference individual is a male, aged between 35 and 40 years, skilled clerical worker, without family bur-
dens, who entered the UCS for other reasons (not end of contract).
10. The fact that males appear to have different hazard rates from females has motivated us to estimate separate mo-
dels for males and females. The precision of these estimates (not reported) is the same as for the entire sample.
11. This result is not a surprise because Lynch (1985) detected no evidence of a significant benefit effect on the
behaviour of London youth.
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Appendix A
The Unemployment Compensation System in Spain
In this appendix we present the main features of the UCS in Spain concisely. As in most
European and transition countries, there are basically two types of unemployment benefits in
Spain: UI and UA. The most recent regulation of the UCS dates from 1992 when eligibility
for UI benefits was tightened and UA widened. Thus, we focus our comments on the
pre-1992 and the post-1992 period.
Before the 1992 period, an unemployed person who lost a job and had a minimum con-
tribution period of 6 months during the previous 48 months received UI of which the entitle-
ment duration was calculated by dividing by 2 the number of months contributed, with the
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constraints that the result had to be an integer multiple of 2. After the 1992 period, the mini-
mum contribution period was modified to 12 months during the last 72 months, and the enti-
tlement duration was calculated by dividing by 3 the number of months contributed, with the
same constraint as before 1992. The level of income provided for the unemployed is deter-
mined by multiplying the gross replacement rate by the average of the «regulatory base» (i.e.
the gross earnings used to calculate UI contributions) in the six months before entering un-
employment. The monthly amount to be received is equivalent to 80 percent of the person’s
last salary during the first six months of benefits (70 percent after 1992), 70 percent from the
seventh to the twelfth month (60 percent after 1992) and 60 percent from the thirteenth
month onwards (60 percent after 1992). UI is subject to a minimum equal to the Statutory
Minimum Wage (SMW) and a maximum equal to 170 percent of the SMW, which could be
increased to 190 percent and 220 percent if the unemployed has one child dependant or more
than one. Since 1993 the minimum has been reduced to 75 percent of the SMW, unless the
recipient has dependant children in which case it is still 100 percent of the SMW.
The unemployed who have worked a period not long enough for UI or have exhausted UI
may access UA. UA payments have no relation with the previous monthly wages. A family in-
come criterion was also used whereby per capita family income could not exceed the SMW. A
flat unemployment benefit equal to 75 percent of the SMW is paid to all beneficiaries. Since
1989, these criteria have been tightened because the notion of family has been restricted and the
per member income requirement is lowered to 75 percent of the SMW for the unemployed with
age less than 45 years old with one dependant. For those more than 45 years old, 100 percent and
125 percent of the SMW is given if they have two dependants or more than two, respectively.
The UA entitlement duration varies according to the UI entitlement duration exhausted,
having or not having family burdens and being more or less than 45 years old. Before the
1992 period, the unemployed with family burdens who exhausted entitlement UI periods
multiple of 3 months (up to 24 months) could access a UA entitlement duration between 18
and 24 months (with age less than 45 years old) or between 24 and 36 months (with age more
than 45 years old). Nevertheless, if they did not have family burdens, only the unemployed
with age greater than 45 years old who exhausted a UI entitlement period longer than 12
months received between 6 and 12 months. In relation to the UA entitlement duration of the
unemployed who were not qualified for UI because they did not have a minimum contribu-
tion period of 6 months before 1992 (or 12 months after 1992), the entitlement duration
changed to between 3 and 5 months before 1992 to between 3 and 21 months after 1992 for
those with family burdens, and after 1992 to 6 months for those without family burdens.
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Appendix B
Resumen
Este artículo muestra que el efecto de las prestaciones por desempleo sobre la probabilidad de abandonar el desem-
pleo en los parados cambia considerablemente cuando se emplea un modelo de duración tradicional que contiene
sólo información de prestaciones contributivas (UI), o de prestaciones asistenciales (UA) como una mera prolonga-
ción del efecto de UI, en lugar de un modelo de duración con un período de prórroga que recoge secuencialmente el
efecto de UI y UA. Se observa que mientras la tasa de salida de los perceptores de UI aumenta considerablemente
cuando ésta llega a su fin, la tasa de los perceptores de UA permanece constante o incluso cae ligeramente al finali-
zar UA. Hay un grupo de parados elegibles para UA que abandonan el desempleo mientras perciben UI debido a la
pérdida de ingreso que experimentarán cuando transiten de UI a UA.
Palabras clave: prestaciones contributivas, prestaciones asistenciales, modelo mixto de riesgos proporcionales, sali-
das secuenciales, heterogeneidad inobservada.
Clasificación JEL: J64.
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Table B1.
Descriptive statistics variables of recipients aged between 18-59 years who receive UI and UA
after UI has expired. Years 1991-93
UI data
Year 1991 Year 1992 Year 1993
% Mean Std % Mean Std % Mean Std
Unemployment duration (months)
Current 8.69 7.13 9.62 6.77 9.55 6.98
Entitlement 10.42 7.50 11.48 7.06 11.98 7.52
UI level (€/month) 475.40 110.05 465.49 142.98 503.77 158.43
Type of observation
Get a job under UI (uncensored) 21.5 21.8 26.9
Exhaust UI (censored) 78.5 78.2 73.2
UI and UA data
Unemployment duration (months)
Current (UI+UA) 15.59 13.40 15.96 12.67 12.97 10.36
Entitlement (UI+UA) 18.30 13.28 18.95 12.64 16.13 10.73
Current UA 18.96 7.21 18.85 7.71 16.17 8.24
Entitlement UA 21.69 4.64 22.19 5.00 19.63 6.83
Level of benefits (€/month)
UI 475.40 110.05 465.49 142.98 503.77 158.43
UA 292.09 43.99 316.73 45.31 328.87 60.04
UI+UA 432.61 135.83 423.85 144.18 482.25 162.21
Type of observation
Get a job under UI (uncensored) 21.5 21.8 26.9
Exhaust UI (censored) 42.2 44.6 52
Get a job under UA (uncensored) 8.2 9.1 6.1
Exhaust UA (censored) 28.1 24.5 15.1
Sample 61,019 47,875 44,558
Source: HSIPRE database.
